The 112 outage of 2019: 5 lessons for telecoms and government

What happened

That Monday afternoon, an outage arose in KPN's telephone network. Customers could barely make calls, neither on landlines nor mobiles. Because every provider in the Netherlands routes its 112 traffic over KPN's network, 112 was also unreachable for customers of other providers.

According to the investigation, the cause lay in a software fault in the routing system, combined with simultaneous failure, so that calls could no longer be directed across the network. People could not reach the fire service, police or ambulance by the usual route. At the same time, NL-Alert partly failed as well, and communication to the public was disorganised. The regulators' conclusion was sharp: government bodies and organisations were insufficiently prepared for a total failure of 112.

Lesson 1: A critical chain needs a fallback option

Routing all 112 traffic over one network is efficient, but it also makes that single point vulnerable. The core question is: what do we do if this fails? Put in place a fully worked-out fallback option, such as an alternative emergency number or alternative routes, and make sure it has been tested in advance.

A fallback option that exists only on paper does not work when it matters. Practise the scenario in which the main facility fails completely, including activating and announcing the alternative.

Lesson 2: Communicate the alternative, quickly and widely

An emergency number or alternative only helps if people know about it. And that has to be achieved while the usual channels are faltering.

• Make the alternative widely known immediately via radio, television, social media and government channels.
• Reckon with the possibility that NL-Alert or other channels may themselves be affected; keep several routes in reserve.
• Keep the message simple and identical across all channels.
• Repeat frequently; not everyone hears it the first time.

Lesson 3: Reckon with several systems failing at once

The difficult part of this crisis was that problems coincided: telephony failed and NL-Alert faltered at the same time. Crisis plans often assume a single outage, but reality sometimes stacks failures on top of one another.

So think in terms of interconnections. If your most important warning channel depends on the same infrastructure that can fail, you have a problem. Map those dependencies and ensure channels that work independently of one another.

Lesson 4: Arrange command and coordination in advance

One of the points of criticism was that national coordination got under way too late. In a crisis that affects the whole country, it must be immediately clear who scales up, who acts as spokesperson and who takes decisions.

Set out those roles and the scaling-up in advance, including for scenarios that rarely occur but have a major impact. Clarity about who is responsible for what prevents costly loss of time in the moment itself.

Lesson 5: Know your reporting obligations (RDI and NIS2)

Telecoms providers are an essential entity. Since 15 August 2026 the Cybersecurity Act (NIS2) has applied: you report a significant incident to the NCSC, with supervision by the Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI). In addition, the requirements on the continuity and security of telecoms networks apply, which the RDI also supervises.

During the crisis, record what happened, when, and which reports were made. Such a factual timeline is not only mandatory but also indispensable for the subsequent investigation and improvement.

How CrisisRadar helps

CrisisRadar gives telecoms providers and the government bodies involved a shared crisis picture. You record facts with their source, draw up a clear message for customers and the public within minutes (including an alternative number if there is one), coordinate with the chain and publish the status on a page of your own that runs separately from your network. Reporting-obligation timers keep track of the deadlines towards the NCSC and the RDI.

Would you like to see how a major telecoms or internet outage unfolds step by step in the platform? Then take a look at the accompanying practical scenario.

Stappenplan

Veelgestelde vragen

Why was 112 unreachable for everyone in 2019?

Because all telecoms providers in the Netherlands route their 112 traffic over KPN's network. When that network failed because of an outage, 112 was also unreachable for customers of other providers.

What made this crisis particularly difficult?

Several systems failed at the same time: telephony went down and NL-Alert faltered too. This made warning the public especially hard. The lesson is to map dependencies and ensure independent channels.

What reporting obligation applies to telecoms providers?

Telecoms providers are an essential entity under the Cybersecurity Act (NIS2): you report a significant incident to the NCSC, with supervision by the Rijksinspectie Digitale Infrastructuur (RDI), which also oversees the continuity of telecoms networks.